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ABSTRACT 
On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform:  Econometric Evidence from the OECD 
Countries* 
by Tomaso Duso 
This paper empirically investigates contrasting views on the politics of economic 
policy. Merging different databases, we test various predictions coming form different 
strands of literature, with the aim of explaining the cross-sectional and temporal 
variation in the degree of regulatory intervention and entry liberalization in the digital 
mobile telecommunications industry of OECD countries during the 1990's. We analyze 
the role of political institutions, government's types and ideological position, industry 
and consumers’ private interests, as well as the regulatory environment in shaping 
regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that all these sets of variables help to explain 
some degree of variability in the observed liberalization patterns among countries. Yet, 
political and regulatory institutions and the pressure of strong incumbent firms are 
found to be the most important factors. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Zur Politik der Regulierungsreform: Ökonometrische Evidenz für  OECD-Länder 
In diesem Beitrag werden verschiedene Theorieansätze zur Wettbewerbspolitik am 
Beispiel der Deregulierung der Mobilfunksindustrie in OECD-Ländern empirisch 
getestet. Die Rolle der politischen Institutionen, der Regierungstypologie und ihrer 
ideologischen Positionierung im politischen Spektrum, der privaten Interessen der 
Industrie und Konsumenten, sowie der Struktur von Regulierungsbehörden wird anhand 
einer neu entwickelten Datenbank untersucht, um die beobachte Variabilität in der 
Deregulierungspolitik zwischen OECD-Ländern zu erklären. Es wird gezeigt, dass alle 
diese verschiedene Faktoren die Deregulierung der Mobilfunksindustrie in OECD-
Länder während der 90er Jahren signifikant beeinflusst haben. Die Struktur der 
politische Institutionen und Regulierungsbehörden sowie der Druck starker 
Unternehmen im Markt sind jedoch die entscheidenden Faktoren des 
Deregulierungsprozesses. 
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Economic deregulation [...] is one of the most important experiments in eco-
nomic policy of our time. Winston (1993, p.1262)
1 Introduction
In the past 20 years, the majority of industrialized countries have experienced an era of deregula-
tion. Many industries, which for decades were guided by the states hand, have been opened up
to competition. Especially in the so called network industries - such as the telecommunications,
airline, post, and electricity industries - the market structure and regulatory instruments have
been widely reformed.1 On the one hand, governments have implemented more competitive
market structures through the liberalization of entry and the privatization of the typically state
owned incumbent operators, while on the other hand, following the developments in the economic
literature, new regulatory designs were introduced with the aim of improving the eﬀectiveness
and eﬃciency of governmental intervention in the market.2
The speed, timings, and extent of these reforms among OECD countries, however, have been
remarkably diﬀerent. Why did some countries liberalize more and quicker? What have been the
determinants of such reforms? We answer these questions by analyzing some new data on the
regulatory reform undertaken during the 1990s in the OECD countries. The analysis that we will
propose is essentially positive and descriptive, but we acknowledge that a deeper understanding
of the process underling the regulatory reform is essential for a correct understanding of the
eﬀects of such reform, since eﬀects and determinants of regulation should be simultaneously
considered.3
According to the public interest view of public policy, one should observe regulation be-
cause market failures generate ineﬃciencies, which could be alleviated through the benevolent
governmental intervention.4 Following the path breaking contribution by Stigler (1971), many
scholars criticized this approach as unrealistic, and questioned the appropiateness of assuming
a benevolent government.5 The alternative view interprets that regulation is essentially a redis-
1See for instance Bergman et al. (1998), a report on the developing of European deregulation especially
concerning the telecommunications industry. For a survey on the history of deregulation see Winston (1993) and
Chang (1997).
2As Winston (1993) pointed out, the role of economic research in the Þeld of regulation has been crucial. He
noted (p.1263): deregulation would never have occurred if economists - especially microeconomists - had not
generally supported it through their research.
3See Duso (2001) and Duso and Röller (2001) for a deeper analysis of this point.
4The welfare economics approach to government intervention is essentially normative, but it would entails
a positive theory of government under particularly strong assumptions such as complete information and the
absence of transaction costs (Noll 1989).
5Actually, this critique to the welfare economic approach dates back at least to Buchanan and Tullock (1962)?.
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tributive process among self interested subjects who want to gain speciÞc beneÞts by the means
of governmental intervention.
Although some contributions have exploited the role of diﬀerent political factors in shaping
the regulatory policy, a well deÞned micropolitically founded theory of regulation has not yet
been fully developed. Nevertheless, there exists a new and fast growing literature on the political
microfoundation of economic policy - what Persson and Tabellini (2000) call political economics
- which is closely related to and shall be helpful when trying to reach a deeper understanding
of the politics of regulatory policy.6 During the 1990s, plenty of political economy models
have been developed, each focusing on particular issues of the political game with the aim of
determining how diﬀerent factors inßuence economic policy. The role of political institutions, of
the governments types and viability, of the politicians ideological and programmatic positions,
of the private interests and of the lobbying activity by pressure groups, of the regulatory agencies
institutional design were analyzed.
Following this renewed theoretical interest, the empirical literature on the politics of economic
policy has found a new impulse as well, but it still remains at its infancy. In this paper we
provide a comprehensive glance at new data on international regulation, thereby contributing
to the debate on the politics of the regulatory reform by oﬀering some new and robust stylized
facts. We adopt a reduced form empirical approach to explain the cross-sectional and time-series
variation in the degree of liberalization and regulation of the mobile telecommunications industry
of the OECD countries during the 1990s. Merging diﬀerent data bases, we empirically analyze
predictions stemming from a rather heterogenous literature, aiming at testing which of these
approaches can better explain the observed regularities. We uncovered a number of stylized
facts about the (de)regulation of the mobile telecommunications industry. So, we show that
majoritarian countries, countries with more accountable regulators, and countries with right-
wing governments liberalized more, whereas countries with proportional electoral systems or
consensus-type of democracies, with a presidential regime, with coalition rather than one-party
governments, and with a strong incumbent Þrm liberalized less.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the related literature.
In Section 3, we provide a theoretical framework for our analysis by introducing political and
economic factors which have been proposed as explanatory variables for regulatory policy. Sec-
tion 4 deals with the description of our database obtained by merging many diﬀerent sources.
Section 5 presents our main model and discusses some methodological problems. We comments
the results in Section 6 and conclude the paper in Section 7, where we present summary remarks
and suggest directions for future research.
6See also Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a microfoundation of economic policy.
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2 Related Literature
The starting point for our review of the literature on the political economy of regulation, is the
private interest view, also known as the economic theory, of regulation (Stigler, 1971). This ap-
proach stresses the role of interest groups in determining governmental intervention. Regulation
is seen as a political process, whose structure has though not been formally modeled, in which
speciÞc interests express their demand for political intervention as a way of redistributing rents
to themselves.7 The presence of market failures generates these rents, and their distribution
among the diﬀerent represented subjects depends on their relative strength (Peltzam, 1976) .8
The consequent redistribution can be eﬃcient if all interests are equally represented (Becker,
1983).9 This theory predicts that diﬀerent groups in the population should try to capture the
regulatory agency.10 Therefore, one should expect to observe variables related to these interest
groups, their strength, size, and organization to signiÞcantly inßuence the observed regulatory
pattern.11
The economic theory of regulation suﬀers however from several pitfalls. The Þrst problem
concerns its failure to model the political process through which the private interests are mate-
rialized in particular policy prescriptions. Essentially, the supply side of regulation is taken as
exogenous, like a black box through which the demand for regulation is transformed in outcome.
Yet, the supply side of the market for regulation, namely the entire public sector policy-making
technology (politicians, governments, legislators, regulatory agencies, courts...), must be consid-
ered in a micropolitically founded theory of governmental intervention, since these actors create,
shape, and monitor the regulatory process.12
7Stiglers deÞnition of economic regulation was quite broad, essentially including all economic acts of the
government.
8The original Stiglerian approach was a one-way capture theory: industry interests are the sole ones to be
represented in the political outcome. Peltzman (1976) went beyond this simple capture theory, and stressed the
role of the regulator as the institution that mediates between consumers and producers interests. Finally, Becker
(1983) extends this dichotomous trade-oﬀ to the case of competition among interest groups.
9Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) formalized the lobbying process through an agency framework, in which the
represented interests placed bids contingent to their favorable policy outcome. This model was applied in several
studies to explain economic policy. For instance, Grossman and Helpman (1994) analyzed trade protection in
such a framework; the predictions of their model have been very successfully supported by the empirical evidence
(Goldberg and Maggi, 1999 and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000).
10See also Laﬀont and Tirole (1991) and (1993) for a theory of regulatory capture. Their focus is, however, on
the optimal agency design in a world with asymmetric information.
11For empirical analyses of interest groups pressure on regulatory decisions see Kroszner and Strahan (1999)
and Duso (2001). See also Potters and Sloof (1996) for an excellent survey of the empirical literature on interest
groups inßuence.
12The political theory of economic policy recently proposed by Laﬀont (1999), which bases on the well developed
incentive or principal-agent theory, may be seen as a possible way to formalize the supply side of regulation.
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Recently, a new theoretical and empirical literature in economics has dealt with the analysis
of the role of political institutions in shaping economic policy.13 For instance, it has been shown
theoretically as well as empirically that the regime type and the electoral rules not only shape
government size and expenditures (Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2001, Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2001,
Lizzeri and Perisco, 2001), but also the tax rate and income distribution (Austen-Smith, 2000).
In this study, we apply this kind of thinking to regulatory policy, because the rational of the
aforementioned literature, namely that the conßict redistribution among diﬀerent interested
agents (and thus the policys determination) depends on political institutions, should also hold
for this regulatory governmental interventions, even if a well speciÞed theoretical model has not
been developed yet.
The second pitfall of the private interest theory of regulation is that it has been very suc-
cessful in explaining regulatory intervention but, as many authors pointed out (see for instance
Peltzman, 1989 and Noll, 1989), has failed to explain the deregulation process, a phenomenon
that, from the 1980s onwards, has been widely observed in many industries and countries. One
possible alternative approach, which has been stressed in political science, is that the ideological
position of the policy makers also matters for policy determination (Kalt and Zuppan, 1984 ,
Hibbs, 1987a and 1987b, Poole and Rosenthal, 1993, Alesina, 1987?, Alesina and Rosenthal,
1995, Irwin and Kroszner, 1999). Although it may be problematic to consider the ideological
position of politicians and voters as an exogenous determinant of economic policy (Poole and
Rosenthal, 1993), we are interested in analyzing whether there exists any kind of relationship
among these issues.
Finally, the private interest theory of regulation, by implicitly assuming that the regulator
is a mere and neutral reßection of the political process generated by the legislator, denies the
agency problem entailed in this relationship. However, as the following quote from Noll (1989,
p.1255) points out, the organization of the regulatory process is surely an important factor to
account for:
Regardless of the motives of political actors, an essential ingredient to a theory
of regulatory policy when the Coase theorem fails [i.e. when there are imperfect
information and transaction costs] is how political oﬃcials control agencies. Whether
the aim of regulation is to maximize eﬃciency or to transfer wealth to a special
interest, politicians face a principal-agent problem in trying to assure reasonable
bureaucratic compliance with the objectives behind a legislative mandate.
This agency problem behind the regulatory structure has been thoroughly analyzed in the lit-
erature (see among others Baron, 1988, Spiller, 1990, Laﬀont and Tirole, 1990 and 1991, Laﬀont,
13Political scientists have much thoroughly analyzed the role that political institutions have in shaping policy
formation. See for instance Lijphart (1999).
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1996 and 1999, Estache and Martimort, 1998, Laﬀont and Martimort, 1999 , Faure-Grimaud
and Martimort, 2000).14 Among other elements this view stresses that the independence, ac-
countability, and transparency of the regulatory process are important factors, which could help
to explain the role of the agency relations between the diﬀerent subjects (Neven et al., 1993).
At this point, we have predictions coming from a rather heterogenous literature that have
dealt, in the last 30 years, with the intriguing topic of the politics of regulation or, more generally,
of economic policy. The contribution of this paper is to take some of these predictions to an
empirical test, using a particularly suitable and new data set.
There are two recent papers, which are very closely related to our approach both in their
motivation and in their econometric analysis. Djankov et al. (2001) analyzed the regulation
of the entry of start-up Þrms in 75 countries. Their analysis concentrated on the bureaucratic
requirements that a Þrm has to accomplish in order to set up a new business. They contrasted
the predictions from diﬀerent theoretical approaches and tested them on new data collected by
the World Bank. The main results of the paper are that the public interest view of regulation
is rejected by the data, the Stiglerian Approach Þnds some support, whereas a tollbooth view
of economic policy - where regulation is pursued for the beneÞts of politicians and bureaucrats
(De Soto, 1990) - seems to explain the cross-sectional variation in the costs and time necessary
to start-up a new business much better.
Li et al. (2001) is a cross-sectional empirical analysis of the political economy of privatization
and competition, which uses a new data set on the telecommunications sector built from diﬀerent
sources like the World Bank, Pyramid, and the ITU (International Telecommunications Union).
They also adopted a reduced form approach basing on a generalized private-interest framework,
and concentrating on the role that interest groups have in shaping the regulatory process. This
theory seems to receive reasonably strong support from the data. Furthermore, since the data set
contains many countries, they could contrast the experiences in democratic vs. non-democratic
countries, in order to assess the role of democracy in shaping private interests ability to inßuence
the policy reform.
Both studies, which surely are an important step in Þlling the lack of empirical research
on the political economy of the regulatory reform, do not investigate the role of political and
regulatory institutions.15 As stressed by other authors (Noll, 2001, Levy and Spiller, 1996)
institutions in place and the rules governing the decision making process play a crucial role in
that they constrain the set of policy choices, and thus, determine the outcome of the reform
process (McCubbins et al., 1989 ).
Also relevant for our research are a set of recent OECD working papers (Boylaud and Nico-
14Fiorina (1982) proposed an alternative approach to the delegation of regualtory authority based on the
uncertainty about costs and beneÞts of regulation.
15See also Pryor (2000) for an empirical analysis of governmental regulation in OECD countries.
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letti, 2000, Gonec, Maher, and Nicoletti, 2000, and Nicoletti, 2001). While they are closely
related to our work because they use some of the data that we use, they diﬀer in their aim, since
they analyze the eﬀects rather than the determinants of regulatory reform.16 The main message
of these studies is that the observed reforms of the regulatory environment could contribute
substantially to improve economic performance (see also Noll, 2001 on this point), but that a
large scope for further reform exists. Our paper will build a counterpart to these studies based
on the political economy view, as a Þrst step of a more ambitious research program in which
determinants and eﬀects of regulatory reforms are being simultaneously analyzed (Duso, 2001
and Duso and Röller, 2001).
One last comment is to be made at this point. The term regulation has been intentionally
used rather generally during this introductory discussion. In the following sections, we shall be
more precise about what we mean by regulatory reform, especially when we describe our data.
This is also important because it is recognized that the politics of regulation and deregulation can
be diﬀerent (Winston, 1993). On the other hand, what we attempt in this Section is to think
in quite general terms about the politics of the regulatory process, which entails regulation,
re-regulation, and also deregulation. We believe, in fact, that a political economy theory of
regulation should be able to encompass all these processes.
3 Theoretical Motivation
The approach that we take in this paper is empirical and consists in the estimation of reduced
form relationships with a descriptive aim. We will not structurally test one particular theory,
but rather we want to ask, looking at new data, whether diﬀerent sets of political variables
systematically inßuenced the regulatory process undertaken in the telecommunications industry
during the 1990s in most of the OECD countries. We are looking for some stylized facts that
help us to understand which political factors drove this reform process. In this Section, we
present some theoretical background for our empirical analysis.
First we analyze the role of political institutions - such as the electoral rule and the political
regime - that are shown to play a crucial role in shaping economic policy. A second set of
explanatory variables is related to the governments political viability. Even though the gov-
ernments and parliaments features are a by-product of the constitutional design, we are still
interested to see whether these characteristics shape the ability to perform regulatory reforms.
Then, we will consider variables related to partisan policy formation as expressed by the pro-
grammatic position of the governments parties on speciÞc public policy issues, as well as by the
16See also Gruber and Verboven (2001) on the eﬀects of entry and standard regulations on the evolution of
cellular markets.
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governments position on the right-left dimension. We then investigate, in the Chicago Schools
tradition, whether the industrys private interests were materialized in policy prescriptions. And
Þnally, we question whether the regulatory institutional environment shapes the policy making
process. In this Section, we derive hypotheses from the theoretical literature that we will test
with the data.
3.1 Regulation, Institutions, and the Government
Political scientists have focused on the analysis of the role of political institutions in shaping
political phenomena. Recently, this comparative policy approach has also been used in eco-
nomics in order to analyze the role of political institutions in shaping economic policy.17 As
noted by Austen-Smith (2000, p.1257):
[..] political institutions matter because the institutional diﬀerences are reßected
in diﬀerences in the incentives of political agents to appeal to particular groups of
voters who typically have distinct economic opportunities and, therefore, distinct
preferences over economic policy.
Persson and Tabellini (1999) and (2001), Persson (2001) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2001)
have theoretically and empirically analyzed whether the electoral rule and regime type inßuence
Þscal policy and public spending. Their empirical Þndings, which are mainly based on their
theoretical results, suggest that political institutions shape economic policy.
Yet no developed theoretical model suggests a systematic microfounded relationship between
regulatory intensity and the institutions in place, even though some political models of regulation
have already stressed the importance of the structure of the decision making and, in particular,
the agency problem between diﬀerent government and bureaucracy levels.18 We believe that
some new empirical evidence, such as stylized facts, will help in deepening our understanding of
these phenomena, and perhaps will stimulate a renewed theoretical discussion on this topic.
One characteristic of the telecommunications industry is that the range of users covers almost
the entire population. This could imply that the regulation of utilities is a policy that interest a
large base of voters, hence it might be considered to be a broad policy program. While this seems
17The comparative policy approach is positive and aims at comparing diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes derived
under diﬀerent assumptions about the political institutions in place, which are considered to constitute the
exogenous rules of the game. Diﬀerently, the approach taken by Laﬀont (1999) is normative and aims at
endogenising the institutional details, under the assumption of the existence of a benevolent dictator, who
optimally designs institutions under imperfect information.
18See Levy and Spiller (1996) for an interesting but less formal analysis of the impact of political and social
institutions on regulatory structure and performance. See also Noll (2001) on the politics of regulatory reform in
developing countries, and Laﬀont and Tirole (1990) and (1991) for more formal analyses.
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to be plausible for the wireline telecommunications industry, it may be much less true for the
cellular telecommunications industry, especially in its early phase, during which cellular services
were still not extensively adopted. There are then some speciÞc group of the population - namely
business and young people - which mostly beneÞt from a competitive mobile telecommunications
industry. In our empirical analysis, we concentrate on the mobile telecommunications entry
regulation or liberalization, thus we assume that this kind of policy is perceived to be a targeted
policy.
From the theoretical literature mentioned above, we borrow the idea that countries with
majoritarian elections should be expected to implement more speciÞc and targeted policies.
This is because smaller districts, which are generally associated with this kind of electoral rule,
foster more competition to capture the support of particular voters. This prediction should also
be reinforced by the fact that politicians internalize less of the positive eﬀect of a broad program,
since the electoral districts in majoritarian elections are smaller. Our Þrst prediction is that in
the mobile telecommunications industry one should observe more liberalization in majoritarian
than in parliamentarian regimes.
It is harder to make a clear cut prediction for the second kind of institutional detail: the
regime type. One of the major diﬀerences among diﬀerent regime types concerns the separation
of powers. Presidential regimes are usually associated with a strong division of power between
parliament and government. In presidential regimes the government is normally more account-
able and can less easily abuse its power (Persson et al., 1997). An implication of this is that in a
presidential regime, since there is a relatively less stable majority of legislators that pursue the
interests of the majority of voters, the opposing interests of smaller minorities may compete with
each other, leading as a result to the choice of broader programs (Persson, 2001). Stretching this
conclusion perhaps too much, we would then expect to observe less liberalization in the mobile
phone market in presidential regimes.
Hypothesis 1 If mobile telecommunications entry liberalization is perceived as a targeted policy
program, countries with majoritarian elections should liberalize more, whereas presidential
regimes should liberalize less.
However, one should be cautious to extend the predictions stemming from the model de-
veloped in public Þnance to the regulatory reform case. First, because as we saw it is diﬃcult
to assess how targeted this policy intervention should be considered, and second, because we
cannot be sure that the mechanisms driving the results in the public Þnance models also hold
in a political economy model of regulation.
Since the dichotomous representation - majoritarian vs. proportional elections and pres-
idential vs. parliamentary regimes - seems to be too simplistic to account for the enormous
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variety of a countrys formal and informal institutions, and in order to improve the quality of
our analysis, we will use also other measures of political institutions. In his inßuential study on
democracy, Arend Lijphart (1999) showed that democracys typologies can be reduced to a clear
two-dimensional pattern along two institutional dimensions: the executives-parties dimension
and the federal-unitary dimension.19 Both indexes tell how majoritarian and how consensual
countries are along the two chosen dimensions, which account for the division of powers be-
tween government and parliament (executive-party) and between diﬀerent level of governments
(federal-unitary). Compared to the previously presented institutional dummies, these two new
variables are a metric measure of institutions, that entails richer information.
In this case, we do not have a microfounded model which predicts how these institutional
details impact on policy.20 Yet, there exists some literature in political science, which stresses the
role of veto players in inßuencing policy reform. In particular, Tsebelis (1995) showed that the
potential of policy change decreases with the number of veto players.21 Since more majoritarian
regimes in Lijpharts sense face less veto players in both dimensions, the prediction should be
that majoritarian democracies should be better able than consensual democracies to implement
policy reform.
Hypothesis 2 More majoritarian democracies along the executive-party and the federal-unitary
dimensions are expected to be more eﬀective than consensual democracies in implementing
policy reform.
A second kind of institutional variables that one can consider is related to the governments
type. This institutional detail is of course related to the electoral system as well as to the
regime type of which it is a by-product. Nevertheless we still want to analyze whether they have
a direct impact on regulatory policy. We consider two diﬀerent government types: one-party
vs. coalition governments.22 Moreover, we want to observe whether the governments political
support and the oppositions fractionalization play a role in shaping the economic policy. In fact
whether a government is viable, i.e. able to eﬀectively govern and implement policies that depart
19The two indexes were obtained by aggregating through factor analysis information about ten diﬀerent political
dimensions. We refer interested readers to Lijpharts book for a very clear and deep analysis.
20Lijphart (1999) showed that these measures of consensus democracy have a signiÞcant impact on many
macroeconomic performance variables. In particular, he showed that consensus democracies have done better
than majoritarian democracies, especially with regard to the control of inßation.
21He also showed that the potential for policy change decreases with the incongruence and with the internal
coehesion of veto players.
22As Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) stressed, the dichotomy one party vs. coalition government in parliamen-
tary democracies parallels the idea of uniÞed vs. divided government in presidential systems. The division of
power can be used by voters to assure a moderation of the governments policy. Moreover, coalition governments,
having more veto players, should face a more persistent status quo bias (Alesina and Drazen 1991) .
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from the status quo, also depends upon the composition of the legislature, and in particular on
how strongly the government is supported in the legislature.23 We can than state the following
claim:
Hypothesis 3 Coalition governments are expected to push the regulatory reform and the liber-
alization process less than one-party government.
3.2 Ideology and Partisan Politics
In the partisan politics tradition, politicians or political parties choose their policies not only
in order to be reelected like in the electoral competition models, but rather because they care
about the policy outcome as well. This implies that the platforms of the diﬀerent politicians
may not converge to the median voters preferred policy, and may instead be driven by partisan
preferences, which should represent the interests of their constituencies (Alesina and Rosenthal,
1995).
Although many scholars argue that in modern industrialized countries ideology has lost
its role in shaping policy, there exists some evidence that partisanship matters, although it is
not always clear how it matters. Poole and Rosenthal (1993) showed that the roll call voting
in the U.S. Congress is very well explained by ideology as expressed by the unidimensional
liberal-conservative measure and, furthermore, that such dimension is intertemporally sta-
ble.24 Rosenthal and Romer (1987) gave some examples of how this unidimensional measure
of ideology is well in line with the Congress voting behavior on speciÞc regulatory issues. Ex-
tending these arguments to a cross-sectional comparison across countries, we argue that the
right-left dimension should also explain regulatory patterns in OECD countries.25
Hypothesis 4 We expect to observe that left-wing governments tend to liberalize less than right-
wing governments.26
23As we already mentioned, according to the existing empirical evidence, regulatory policy seems to have a
great degree of inertia (Joskow and Rose, 1989 and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort, 2000). Regulatory policy
seems, in fact, to react only to major political shocks rather than to changes in economic factors. The departure
from the status quo may be, for this kind of policy, even more diﬃcult than for others.
24As Romer and Rosenthal (1987, p.111) pointed out: [...] ideology is a dimension on which are projected the
myriad issue dimensions of politics. It is a remarkable fact that a single dimension, with considerable stability,
characterizes voting in the U.S. congress. [...] voting in a manner consistent with ideological location may well
be consistent with close attention to constituents interest.
25As Thomas Cusack (1997) points out, Lower income groups and labor in general [i.e., the left] are seen
as favoring a large and active state. This is a state heavily engaged in regulating the market and using public
Þnance to equalize the outcomes of market operations.
26On the other hand, one could expect right-wing governments, which should be more pro-business, to regulate
entry more heavily in order to protect the interests of those Þrms which already are in the market.
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Yet, one legitimate question is whether the right-left dimension is a suﬃcient statistic for
the parties/governments ideological position on particular issues, or whether information about
the governments programmatic position on these particular issues do a better job in explaining
policy variation. In our case, we can use some interesting measures on issues such as regulation
and welfare state limitation, and hence analyze how the right-left variables signiÞcance level
varies after inserting such measures as regressors. In a sense, this is a test of the explanatory
power of the right-left synthetic measure.
3.3 Private Interests
The private interests theory of regulation stresses the role of competition among interest groups
in shaping economic policy. If all parties are equally represented, the tougher this competition is,
the more eﬃcient the policy outcome should be. Generally, though, the industry has more intense
and better organized interests than, for instance, consumers, who are also aﬀected by regulatory
reforms and whose interests are often opposite to those of the industry (more competition to
foster lower prices, higher quality, and more product diversity). Consumers, in fact, face the
typical free rider problem in group formation (Olson, 1965), hence their lobbying activity might
be less eﬀective than the lobbying by telecommunication Þrms that already operate in the market,
which are few and whose interests are more aligned. Among Þrms, though, there can also be
strong diﬀerences. Incumbents should be more interested in protecting their market from new
entry, calling for a tougher entry regulation. On the contrary, potential entrants should lobby
to lower entry barriers and to push forward the liberalization process.
In this paper, we will analyze this kind of mechanism, at least partially. Our expectation
is that the higher the incumbents market share, the more resources it should spend in order
to slow down the liberalization process. These Þrms have in fact much to loose in a liberalized
environment. On the other hand, when the industry proÞts are high, then the entrant Þrms
lobbying intensity should be higher, since the gain from lobbying - i.e., the possibility to enter a
proÞtable market - is higher.27 Finally, from the consumers side, we use the active population,
i.e. the population between 15 and 64 years, as a good proxy for the consumers interests.
Relative to the entire population, adolescents and people in the labor force would mostly gain
from a liberalization of the mobile industry. The reason is that liberalization should imply a
more competitive environment with lower prices and these groups are the main potential users.
Hypothesis 5 Countries are more likely to liberalize when the incumbents market share is low,
the industry proÞts are high, and the proportion of active population is high.
27This is by no means a perfect measure for potential entrants interests, since high proÞts are also in the
interest of the incumbent Þrm. However, one can hope to capture the former if controlling for another measure
of the incumbents interests such as its market share.
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3.4 Regulatory Institutional Environment
The regulatory institutions in place are the result of a delegation process involving politicians and
bureaucrats. As already mentioned, this relationship has been widely analyzed in the theoretical
literature. Nevertheless there is little empirical evidence helping to evaluate this theories. The
government writes contracts that should entail the right incentives for bureaucrats to operate
eﬃciently. This analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. We will assume that the
institutions that result from these contracts shape economic policy decision.28
One problem in our speciÞc case is that regulatory institutions in telecommunications have
been partially reformed during the sample period, and sectorial authorities were created to
handle the liberalization and privatization processes. In our approach, instead, we assume
that regulatory institutions remained constant during the sample period, since the information
contained in the OECD database does not follow their temporal evolution, but rather gives
a picture of them around the end of the sample. Nevertheless, we think that it is useful to
incorporate these variables in our study, in order to stimulate the discussion, but keeping in
mind that a deeper and more careful analysis is needed.
There are essentially two main characteristics of a regulatory agency, which have been pointed
out as particularly important to explain their ability to implement regulatory policy: their in-
dependence and their accountability. The argument about regulators independence from the
political power that appointed it is that such independence should help to ease the regulatory
capture problem (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). First, a more independent regulator should face a
less severe time inconsistency problem, because it is less concerned with electoral cycle consid-
erations. Second, a more independent regulator should more likely purse the general interest,
because it is less dependent on a captured government. The argument behind the idea to keep
agencies more accountable is that this accountability should counterbalance the natural in-
equality in the ability of diﬀerent interest groups to inßuence regulatory practice, including the
well-known tendency for consumer interests to be less well organized than those of producers
(Neven et al., 1993). If this is true, then one should expect to observe a more pronounced
liberalization pattern in those countries where the agencies were more independent and more
accountable.
Hypothesis 6 Countries are more likely to liberalize when their regulatory authority are more
independent and more accountable.
28The theory of regulatory capture proposed by Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) stresses the role of the regulatory
environment in shaping interest groups ability to inßuence the regulatory policy. Regulatory institutions should
then be designed in order to minimize the possibility of regulatory failure.
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3.5 Demographic and Economic Controls
We control for speciÞc demographic and economic characteristics which are supposed to consti-
tute a source of observable heterogeneity among countries, such as the population level (POP)
and the income per capita (YPC). In fact, a correlation between higher income per capita and
good government and lower need for regulation is likely to exists.29
In general, we make these controls to account for the demographic and economic conditions
of the country, which may shape the economic policy decision (Besley and Case, 2000). Further-
more, one can think of these controls as accounting for the diﬀerences in the market conditions
among states. For example, we expect that small countries - such as Luxembourg - do not
have a competitive market structure because they constitute a natural monopoly since potential
demand is very small. Finally, we also control for a time trend, which should capture the market
evolution and the technological change. These have been important elements determining the
development of the mobile telecommunications industry and its regulation.
4 The Data
Our data set, merged from diﬀerent databases, constitutes an unique source of information for
analyzing of the politics of regulation. On the one hand, it contains information about the
regulatory process, the market structure, and the regulatory environment in OECD countries;
while on the other hand it includes information on these countries institutional and political
environment.
The regulatory variables are taken from a database on international regulation recently
published by the OECD (see Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000, Gonec, Maher and Nicoletti, 2000,
and Nicoletti, 2001). The database consists of primary data, provided mainly by means of ad hoc
questionnaires and existing OECD publications. Furthermore, some indicators were estimated
to facilitate the use of the detailed aggregated data and to allow comparisons between countries
with diﬀerent regulatory systems. The primary data consist of qualitative information (such as
binary answers, multiple choice answers or answers providing more detailed information about
regulatory provisions) as well as quantitative information (such as number of licenses, market
shares and industry performances). Additionally there are general reports about the regulatory
environment in and around 1998.
Figure 1 displays two indexes on the regulatory intensity in the Þxed line and mobile telecom-
munications industries developed by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), which were calculated aggre-
gating diﬀerent information through a factor analysis and represent an average over the period
29See Djakanov et al. (2001). A reason for this could be that richer countries may deal better with market
failures than poorer.
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1991-1997.30 So, for instance, the UK presents the lowest regulatory intensity in the wireline
and the mobile telecommunications industries. On the other extreme, Turkey and Switzerland
regulate the most.
Figure 1: Regulatory intensity in the fixed-line and mobile telecommunications industries
The most interesting element, which emerges from the previous figure, is the high level of
heterogeneity in the regulatory processes among OECD countries. Figure 2 plots the index on
regulatory intensity in the mobile telecommunications industry and the degree of liberalization
of the digital mobile telecommunications industry.31
Also in this case, we observe a great deal of heterogeneity among countries, with the UK
on the top-right corner (competitive industry with low regulatory intensity) and Switzerland on
the bottom-left corner (monopoly and high regulatory intensity).
Moreover, looking at Figure 3, which plots the time evolution of the cross-sectional average
of the degree of liberalization between 1991 and 1997, we observe also variability in the time
dimension, which suggests that the deregulation and liberalization of the telecommunications
30The “0” means high regulatory intensity while “1” means low regulatory burdens. The regulatory index for
the mobile industry aggregate information about the internationalization, the liberalization and market structure
of the domestic mobile telecommunications market, while the regulatory index for the fixed telephony considers
also the state ownership of the PTO. We are very grateful to Giuseppe Nicoletti for sharing his data.
31 In the Figure the time average of the variable DIGITLIB is represented for each country. This variable
takes value 1 if the market is a monopoly, 2 if it is a duopoly, and 3 if the market is more competitive (3 or more
firms).
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Figure 2: Degree of entry liberalization and regulatory intensity in the mobile telecommuncia-
tions industry.
industry was an on-going process during the sample period. Our aim is to explain both sources
of variability in observed policy.
The second database that we use, which is our major source for the political side of our
data, has been developed by the Institutions and Social Change s Unit of the Wissenschaftszen-
trum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). The original data base was Þrst built by the Manifesto
Research Group of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and was later devel-
oped at the WZB in the so-called Comparative Manifestos Project. In this data-set, various
aspects of the party and governmental system are examined on the basis of quantitative con-
tent analyses of party manifestos and government declarations. The original collection includes
2,359 manifestos from 614 diﬀerent parties in 461 national elections between 1945 and 1999.
This originates from 52 countries, including all OECD countries with the exception of Korea
and 24 central and eastern European countries (see Budge et al., 2001). Furthermore, these
original data have been extended to cover information about the elected governments during the
sample period. This information, which has been derived from Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge
(1998), has been subsequently extended and corrected at the WZB.32
Our data on political institutions is based on two sources. On the one hand, we use two
32We are particularly grateful to Andrea Volkens for kindly providing us the data.
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Figure 3: Time Evolution of Entry Liberalization in the Digital Mobile Telecommunications
Industry
dummy variables developed by Persson and Tabellini (1999), which take value one for countries
with majoritarian elections (MAJOR) and for countries with presidential regimes (PRES).33
On the other hand we use the two indexes (EXEC_PAR and FED_UNIT) developed by
Arend Lijphart (1999) that we presented in the previous section. These indexes are a metric
measure of the institutional details and, particularly, expressive of how majoritarian or consen-
sual each country is along the two chosen policy dimensions. The distribution of countries along
these two dimensions is graphically represented in Figure 4. For instance, the U.S. is consensual
in the federal-unitary dimension ([..] strong federalism and judicial review, a rigid constitution,
an independent central bank, and a bicameral parliament albeit of only medium strength) and
majoritarian in the executives-parties dimension ( [...] dominant one party cabinets, a roughly
two-and-a-third party system, plurality election and interest group pluralism), whereas the
U.K. is very majoritarian and Switzerland very consensual in both dimensions.34
Finally, from the OECD statistical compendium we collected information about the coun-
tries demographic and economic conditions. Since the diﬀerent data sets span diﬀerent time
periods and cover diﬀerent countries we found a minimum common denominator in the merg-
33We thank Guido Tabellini for allowing us to use the data.
34The quotations from Lijphart (1999) p. 249.
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Figure 4: The Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy
ing procedure. Our Þnal data set covers 24 OECD countries in the time period 1991-1997. In
Table 1a we brießy deÞne the main variables and their sources, while Table 1b presents the
summary statistics for these variables.
Some Þrst facts emerge. The diﬀerent branches of the telecommunications industry have
very diﬀerent regulatory patterns. The wireline, which is an older industry with a long public
monopoly history, had a higher degree of state control (FIXREG) than the mobile industry
(MOBREG), which is instead a young, dynamic, and quickly developing industry.35 The
more precise measure of entry liberalization in the digital mobile telecommunications indus-
try (DIGITLIB) indicates that, in the sample period, cellular markets were on the average
duopoly markets. On average, the incumbent Þrm had 63% market shares (SH_MD1). The
states ownership share in the incumbent telecommunications operator in the mobile industry
(SH_INCMO) was on average 57%. In the sample period and across countries the average
mobile industry revenues per-year (REV_MOB) were equal to 10 thousand billion U.S. dollars.
In the sample, 25% of the countries had majoritarian elections (MAJ), but only 9% had
a presidential regime (PRES). The other two institutional variables indicate that the average
country was more consensual in the executive-party (EXEC_PAR) than in the federal-unitary
(FED_UNIT) dimension.
35The two indexes take value 0 for high regulatory intensity and value 1 for low regulatory intensity.
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The governments represented in our Þnal data set were mostly coalition governments (GOV_COAL
in 57% of the observations) with 1.97 member parties on the average (COALSIZ) and an aver-
age center-right wing (RILE) orientation.36 The average government had the 55% of the seats
in the legislature (PSEAT_G), and were opposed by more than 4 parties (OPP_PAR). The
two variables related to the parties programmatic position concerning speciÞc policy questions
- pro regulation (PRO_REG) and favorable to welfare state limitation (WELF_LIM) - rep-
resent, in percent value, how often a sentence relative to a particular policy area was mentioned
in the partys program.37 So, for instance, pro-regulation statements constitute, on average,
1.77% of the governments program, whereas pro-welfare state limitation statements represent
only 0.44% of the governments program.
Figure 5: Governments Position on the Right-Left Dimension
The head of the regulatory authority had in 66% of the cases a deÞnite term of oﬃce
(TERM_DEF), was in 29% of the cases appointed by the prime minister (APP_GOV),
in 17% of the cases by the president (APP_PRES) and in the rest of the cases by the sectorial
minister. Finally, the regulatory authority was in 67% of the cases Þnanced, at least partially,
36See Budge et al. (2001) for a precise description of how this variable was constructed. The variable takes
values in the range -50 (extreme left) and + 50 (extreme right). See Figure 5 for a graphical representation. For
coalition governments, all the considered measures are a weighted average of the same measure for all parties in
the governments coalition. The adopted weight is the percentage seats in parliament held by each party.
37See Budge et. al. (2001) for a more precise deÞnition and motivation. The raw data include 56 categories
grouped in 7 broader policy areas.
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through industry fees (FIN_IND), had a report duty (REP_YES) in 75% of the cases (25%
to the legislature and 50% to the minister), and in 70% of the case their decisions could not be
overturned by any other political institution (OVER_NO).
5 The Empirical Methodology
The general form of the equation that we estimate is the following:
policyit = α+ βt + γ1Cit + γ2Xit + ²it (1)
where α is a constant term, βt is a time trend, Cit is a vector of demographic controls, and
Xit is a vector of exogenous political variables. We will use diﬀerent sets of exogenous variables
in order to observe how much of the cross-section and time-series variation in the observed policy
can be accounted for by each of these sets.
Cross-sectional regressions
As a Þrst step in our empirical study we analyze the cross-sectional variability in regulatory
intensity. For this Þrst set of regressions we can thus use the index for the mobile telephony
developed by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), which is a richer and more informative measure
of the regulatory environment. We perform a cross-sectional regression, where we collapse all
variables towards their mean value (a bar over the variables means that we take their time
average):38
policyi = α+ γ1Ci + γ2Xi + ²i (2)
We perform two robustness tests: the Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity and the
Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables.39 Although we have very few observation (24 coun-
tries in the sample), we will observe whether some Þrst qualitative results emerge, which can
later be compared to the Þndings obtained with the more correct panel methods. The advantage
of this approach is that we concentrate on the policys cross sectional variation only.
Panel Regressions
As we already acknowledged, our database allows us to use panel methods to account for
unobserved heterogeneity. This approach should lead to more accurate estimates of the eﬀects
of political-economic variables on policy outcome. Unfortunately, the indicators developed by
38This is the so called between estimator, it is not particularly eﬃcient, since it discards all the over-time
information of the data.
39For a description see STATA manual vol. 3 p. 97.
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Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) are averaged over the sample period and, therefore, do not present
time variation and cannot be used in panel regressions. Hence, we use a second variable related
to the degree of liberalization and of entry liberalization in the digital mobile telecommunications
industry (DIGITLIB) as a dependent variable. This takes value 1 if the market is a monopoly,
2 if it is a duopoly, and 3 if the market is more competitive (3 or more Þrms).40 This ordered
variable can be seen as the observable counterpart of a continuous latent variable, which can
be thought of as the intensity of entry liberalization, or as the utility derived by the policy
maker by implementing one of the mentioned market structures.
One could estimate such a model as a linear regression model, denying the ordinal nature of
the dependent variable, and in this way implicitly assuming that the intervals between adjacent
categories are of equal length. This would imply a potential bias in the coeﬃcients estimates
that can be very strong. The appropriate method to estimate a model with an ordinal dependent
variable is the so called ordered probit model.41 Furthermore, because of the panel nature of our
sample, we estimate the ordered probit model with country random eﬀects, where it is assumed
that the error term is constituted by two components, a country speciÞc term ui, and a white
noise error term ²it:
policy∗it = α+ βt + γ1Cit + γ2Xit + ui + ²it,
policyit =

1
2
3
if
τ0 ≤ policy∗it < τ1
τ1 ≤ policy∗it < τ2
τ2 ≤ policy∗it < τ3
. (3)
Where policy∗it is the latent variable, policyit is the observed categorical variable, and the τ
0s
are the so called thresholds, which determine the length of each category and which will also be
estimated.42
For the panel speciÞcations, we adopt as a measure of Þt the Mc Faddens pseudo R-squared,
which is deÞned as follows:
R2MF = 1−
ln bL (Mβ)
ln bL (Mα) ,
40Unfortunately, the information about the number of Þrms is not available in the database. The right censoring
problem could therefore not be overcomed.
41The ordered probit model assumes that the error term is normally distributed. See Long (1997) for a very
clear presentation of ordinal regression models. See also Maddala (1987) for further discussion.
42We used LIMDEP to estimate the ordered probit model with random eﬀects. The identiÞcation assumption
in this case is that τ1 = 0 and the model is estimated with a constant. See Limdep Users Manual (1998).
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where ln bL (Mβ) is the log-likelihood function for the model with regressors, while ln bL (Mα)
is the log-likelihood function for the model with just the intercept.
6 Empirical Results
In this Section, we summarize our results. The main aim of this study is to produce robust
stylized facts about the political economy of the regulatory process. We intentionally adopt a
reduced form approach, although we recognize that it has potential pitfalls, especially concerning
the interpretation of the coeﬃcients estimates. Nevertheless, we are conÞdent that our analysis
can contribute to the debate on the politics of regulation, because the empirical evidence is still
very scarce.
6.1 Cross-sectional Regressions
Table 2 is our starting point. It reports the results of the cross-sectional regressions, where the
dependent variable is the regulation intensity index in the mobile telecommunications industry
(MOBREG) developed by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000). Following our presentation in the
previous section, we regress diﬀerent sets of dependent variables separately, in order to under-
stand how much each of those sets contributes to an explanation of the cross-sectional variability
in the regulatory policy. Since the number of observations is quite small, we choose to adopt
parsimonious speciÞcations.
The Þrst set of political variables that we consider relates to the countrys political insti-
tutions. In this case, we only use the institutional dummies taken from Persson and Tabellini
(1999). These measures of political institutions are highly signiÞcant and have the expected
sign. In particular, the degree of deregulation is higher in countries with a majoritarian election
rule (MAJ), while the presidential regime type implies a tougher regulatory policy (PRES).43
Among the control variables, only the population is signiÞcant. This speciÞcation has a very
high explanatory power (Adj. R2 = 0.5248), meaning that more than 50% of the variation in
regulatory intensity among countries can be explained by these simple measures of their political
constitution. Both the null hypotheses of homoskedasticity and no omitted variables are not
rejected, which gives us conÞdence in our estimates.
43We also run the same regression using the metric measures of institutions. Both measures are signiÞcant
and, as expected, more majoritarian countries in both the executive-parties (EXEC_PAR) and federal-unitary
(FED_UNIT) dimensions were better able to implement the liberalization process in the mobile telecommunica-
tions industry. We then run the model with the four variables together, the results remain practically unchanged
and the Þt of the regression increases signiÞcantly (Adj. R2 = 0.6578). In this latter case, however, the het-
eroskedasticity test fails. These results can be obtained from the author upon request.
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The second set of political variables that we use is also related to institutional details,
and particularly to the government type and viability. We contrast one-party (GOV1P) to
coalition governments (GOVCOAL), and we further control for the cohesiveness of the coali-
tion governments, as expressed by the number of parties in the coalition (COALSIZ), for the
governments support in the legislature (PSEAT_GO), and for oppositions fractionalization
(OPP_PART).44 In this case, the political variables are almost not signiÞcant. The only sig-
niÞcant term is the percentage seats in the legislature held by the government parties, which is
negative. The Adjusted R-squared was much lower than in the previous speciÞcation and the
F-test failed, meaning that this speciÞcation was bad.
We then test the role of the governments ideological position, using three diﬀerent mea-
sures. First, we use the synthetic indicator for the governments right-left position (RILE).
This variable, which was created by Laver and Budge (1992) and tested several times by politi-
cal scientists, is a synthetic measure for the overall political position of the considered party.45
All other things being equal, the governments position in the right-left dimension does not play
a signiÞcant role in explaining regulatory intensity.46 To better understand how strong the ideo-
logical position concerning some speciÞc issues is transformed in eﬀective policy - once the parties
came to power - we use two further variables, which are related to the governments attitude
towards regulation (PRO_REG) and towards the welfare states limitation (WELF_LIM).
Both variables have the expected sign, but only the pro-welfare limitations position is signiÞcant
at the 10% level: Governments formed by parties which were programmatically in favor of wel-
fare states limitations liberalized more. Sign and signiÞcance of the demographic controls are
similar to the previous speciÞcations. Also this last speciÞcation has a quite high explanatory
power (Adj. R2 = 0.5058), even though the regression seems to be badly speciÞed since the
F-test fails. Both the omoskedasticity and the Ramsey tests accept the null hypotheses.
We then regress our dependent variable on a set of variables, which should capture the private
interests theorys arguments. While, on the one hand, we proxy the incumbent Þrms interest by
using their market share (SH_MD1), on the other hand we proxy potential entrants interests
by using the log of industry revenues (log(REV_MOB)). Finally, we use the population
between 15 and 64 years (ACTPOP) to proxy for the consumers interests. Only the proxy
for the incumbents interests results signiÞcant at the 1% level: a strong incumbent achieved
a less liberalized environment. The variable that proxies for consumers interests - i.e., the
44For identiÞcation, we suppress the GOV1P dummy since we estimate the model with a constant.
45For coalition governments, the considered measure is a weighted average of the same measure for all parties
in the governments coalition. The adopted weight is the percentage seats in parliament held by each party.
46Note that this stays true also if we regress the regualtory intensity on the controls and RILE alone. However,
it should also be mentioned that the use of such a measure in the cross sectional regression may be problematic,
since we average the position of diﬀerent governments along the time dimension.
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active population - has the expected positive sign, but it is not signiÞcant. The variable
that proxies for the potential entrants interests is not signiÞcant as well, but it presented the
negative sign.47 The fact that both these variables are not signiÞcant is not unexpected. For
consumers, as well as for potential entrants, it is much more diﬃcult than for an incumbent Þrm
to organize their interests because of the well known free riding problem in lobby formation.
Furthermore, potential entrants might have found it more diﬃcult to lobby eﬀectively, since
they were endowed with less resources than the incumbent Þrm. This speciÞcation performs
extremely well, explaining more than 70% (Adj. R2 = 0.7306) of the variability in regulatory
intensity. The proposed speciÞcation tests accept both the null hypotheses.
Finally, we analyze the role of regulatory institutions. We proxy regulators independence
by a dummy equal to one if the regulators decision could not be overturned by any other polit-
ical institutions (OVER_NO), and regulators accountability by a dummy equal to one if the
agency must report either to the parliament or to the sectorial minister (REP_YES). Surpris-
ingly, we Þnd a negative and statistically signiÞcant (5% signiÞcance level) relationship between
our measure of regulators independence and the intensity of regulation: a more independent
regulator adopted a more restrictive regulatory policy. In contrast, regulators accountability
has a positive, though not signiÞcant, impact on regulatory intensity. This speciÞcation per-
forms much worse than the previous ones (Adj. R2 = 0.3221) but, as we pointed out, this can
be due to our measures of regulatory institutions rather than to theoretical reasons. In this case,
in fact, both the omitted variable and the omoskedasticity tests fail.
6.2 Panel Regressions
Next, we perform panel regressions, which should enable us to make more precise and accurate
predictions, since they allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across observations.
In this case, however, we cannot use the synthetic index developed by Boylaud and Nicoletti
(2001) as the dependent variable, because it does not entail the temporal dimension. As we
already mentioned, we use in this case DIGITLIB as the dependent variable, which is an
ordered variable that describes the degree of market liberalization. A precise comparison with
the previous results is not possible since the dependent variable is diﬀerent. However, we can still
compare whether the signiÞcance and the direction of the coeﬃcients estimates are consistent
with the previous estimations.48 Moreover, we must keep in mind that in this case we also
capture the additional variation in the dependent variable along the time dimension. For this
47Since high revenues are also in the interest of incumbent Þrms, one can think that the coeﬃcients estimate
is not signiÞcant because the opposite actions of incumbents and entrants counterbalanced.
48The two variables - MOBREG and DIGITLIB - are, in fact, strongly positive correlated (the correaltion
coeﬃcient is 0.7024).
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reason, we also introduce a time index (TIME_IND) to account for temporal changes in the
market.49 Since the ordered regression model is non linear in the outcome probabilities, the
interpretation of coeﬃcients size is not straightforward. Hence, we concentrate our analysis on
the sign and signiÞcance of coeﬃcients.50
Table 3 reports the results for the speciÞcations in which we use the political institutions
as the explanatory variables. Among the control variables, only the time trend appear to have
a signiÞcant and positive eﬀect, which means that there was a general tendency towards lib-
eralization during the 1990s.51 The population has a positive but less signiÞcant impact on
cellular markets liberalization, while the income pro capita has no signiÞcant impact on the
liberalization process. The positive sign of the population coeﬃcient was expected, since in
larger countries the potential users of mobile services are more, therefore a more competitive
market structure is sustainable.
When we turn to the variables related to political institutions, we observe that some of them
are highly signiÞcant. This broadly conÞrms the previously obtained results, yet some diﬀerences
emerge. The two institutional dummies have the expected sign: countries with majoritarian
elections liberalized more, whereas countries with presidential regimes liberalized less. However,
we observe that the presidential dummy is never signiÞcant. In the second speciÞcation, when we
use the two institutional indexes alone, both of them are highly signiÞcant and have the expected
negative sign: the need for consensus in both institutional dimensions made policy change more
diﬃcult. The Þt of the regression, though, decreases if compared to the Þrst speciÞcation.
Finally, we propose a third speciÞcation where all the institutional measures are simultaneously
used and only two of them stay signiÞcant. The majoritarian dummy and the index of consensus
in the federal-unitary dimension are still highly signiÞcant and have the expected signs. Both
eﬀects reinforce if compared to the previous speciÞcations. The presidential dummy and the
executive-party dimensions index have instead the expected signs, but are not signiÞcant. In
all speciÞcations, the standard deviation of the random eﬀects (SIGMA) is highly signiÞcant,
which indicates that this econometric approach is appropriate, since unobserved heterogeneity
49We do not estimate the model with time Þxed eﬀects because the dependent variable presents little variation
in the time dimension. The use of years dummies lead in fact to problems in the convergence of the estimates.
50 In order to make clear predictions on the coeﬃcients size, one should considered the fully standardized
coeﬃcients. In this case the eﬀect of the independent variables on the latent dependent variable can be indicate in
its original unit of measure. Predictions will then be in terms of standard deviation increases, which are anyway
diﬃcult to give a economic sense.
51This was expected. Starting from the 1980s, an era of deregulation has started in most of the industrialized
countries, following the idea that state intervention cannot enhance market eﬃciency. Since then public utilities,
and telecommunications in particular, have been widely deregulated and liberalized. Moreover, as we mentioned,
the time trend should also capture the positive eﬀect of technological change, which might have made possible
the implementation of a more competitive market structure.
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among countries matters. Concerning the measure of Þt, the Þrst speciÞcation is the best and
explain almost 43% of the observed cross-sectional and temporal variation in the observed policy.
Yet, a direct comparison with the cross-sectional regressions is diﬃcult because the dependent
variables diﬀer. Nevertheless, we can point out that political institutions explained much of the
cross-sectional variation in the liberalization process, but they seem to be less able to explain
its temporal variability.52
Table 4 displays the results of the speciÞcations where we use the governments type and
its viability as the independent variables. Diﬀerently to the cross-sectional regressions, we Þnd
evidence here that coalition governments have a strong and signiÞcant negative impact on the
degree of entry liberalization. Moreover, when we control for the governments support in the
parliament and for the number of opposition parties, also the size of the coalition has a positive
impact on the industrys liberalization. If, on the one hand, this result seems to support the idea
that veto players may impede policy reform because coalition governments liberalized less, on
the other hand, it is less clear why larger coalitions should have been able to liberalize more.53
The diﬀerences observed between cross-sectional and panel regressions might suggest that the
governments type is more important for explaining the variability along the time dimension,
i.e. the speed of the liberalization process, than the cross-sectional diﬀerences in the degree of
entry regulation. Again, the random eﬀects standard deviation is highly signiÞcant, supporting
our empirical approach. Both speciÞcations show that the governments type could account for
about 40% of the variability in the deregulation of entry.
Table 5 reports the results for the regressions of the degree of liberalization on ideological
variables. First, we use the simple right-left position as a regressor. It is positive and signiÞcant
at the 1% level, which means that, during the sample period, right-wing governments tended to
liberalize more, as expected. We then use the two variables related to the more speciÞc positions
pro-regulation and pro-welfare state limitation, which are also signiÞcant at the 1% signiÞcant
level. As expected, if the government announced to be pro-regulation it liberalized less, whereas
if it announced to be pro-welfare-state-limitations it liberalized more. When we use the three
measures simultaneously, however, only the programmatic position pro-regulation is signiÞcant
and presents the expected negative sign. Looking at the pseudo R-squared, we observe that the
second speciÞcation is the one which better performs, explaining almost 46% of the variability.54
52Also, we performed a likelihood ratio test between speciÞcations in order to test whether the model of
speciÞcation 1 and of speciÞcation 2 are nested in the model of speciÞcation 3. We reject the null hypothesis that
the constraints imposed to the second speciÞcation are true at the 1% signiÞcance level, while we accepted the
null in the case of the Þrst speciÞcation.
53Actually, Keefer (2001) proves that the favor to special interests can decrease in the number of veto players, if
governments are formed by veto players from the group of veto players who are most harmed by favors to special
interests. This could be a possible explanation for our Þnding.
54Again we perform the likelihood test in which we pair-wise compare the richest speciÞcation to the other two
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We then turn to the private interests theory of regulation. Table 6 displays the results
for three diﬀerent speciÞcations. Because of the lack of information on market shares and
industrys revenues, we must discard some observations. The Þrst is a parsimonious speciÞcation,
in which we insert one variable for each of the interests in place: the incumbent, the potential
entrants, and the consumers. The results reßect our expectations, at least partially. First, the
degree of entry liberalization is signiÞcantly lower when the incumbents market share is larger.
The interpretation is that the incentive to lobby and the lobbying eﬀectiveness should increase
with the incumbents strength in the market, since its beneÞts from a concentrated industry
structure are higher when its market share is bigger. The coeﬃcients estimate of the proxy
for potential entrants interests (industry revenues) is negative, but it is signiÞcant only in the
Þrst speciÞcation, while the coeﬃcients estimate of the proxy for consumers interests (active
population) have the expected positive sign, but is not signiÞcant in any speciÞcation. Also this
result was somehow expected. As we already acknowledged, both the potential entrants and the
consumers face the typical free-rider problem in the creation of a lobby group, which can prevent
them to eﬀectively lobby the regulator. The measure of Þt of this speciÞcation is comparable to
the pseudo R-squared of the previous regressions. About 40% of policy variability is explained
by our regressors.
In the second speciÞcation, we insert a dummy equal to one if the regulatory agency is, at
least partially, Þnanced through industry fees. The coeﬃcients estimate for the incumbents
market share stay negative and signiÞcant. Also the new variables coeﬃcient is negative and
highly signiÞcant. The interpretation is that a regulator that is Þnanced by the industry may be
more easily captured. Finally, we also controlled for the states ownership share in the incumbent
Þrm.55 Also in this speciÞcation the estimated coeﬃcient for the measure of the incumbents
private interests is negative and highly signiÞcant. Although these results seem to strongly
support the private interest theory, one should take them cautiously. This is because to consider
market structures variables as exogenous may generate biased estimates, since the regulatory
policy inßuences market structure. Therefore a two way causality between determinants and
eﬀects of regulation may exists, which should be accounted for (Duso, 2001 and Duso and Röller,
2001).
Finally, we analyze the role of regulatory institutions. Also in this case we estimate three
diﬀerent speciÞcations. In Table 7 we report our Þndings. From the Þrst speciÞcation it emerges
that our measures of the regulators accountability has a positive, large, and very signiÞcant
(1% level) impact on entry liberalization, while the measure for the regulators independence is
speciÞcations. The Þrst speciÞcation is nested in the third, while this is not the case for the second speciÞcation.
55 It is worthwhile to mention that this variable can be endogenous. In fact, the telecommunications incumbent
operator was privatized in the same period during which the industry was liberalized. Both processes have to be
considered as part of the regulatory reform undertaken in the industry (OECD, 2000).
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not signiÞcant.56 When we turn to the second speciÞcation, in which we insert two dummies
to control for the regulators appointment method (equal to one if the regulator was appointed
by the government or by the president respectively) we observe that these are positive and
statistically very signiÞcant. While the result is diﬃcult to interpret, it suggests that more precise
measures of the regulators independence should be developed. The regulators appointment
method, in fact, plays a crucial role in determining its independence degree. Finally, we control
for a measure of the regulators term of oﬃce. We use a dummy equal to one if the term of oﬃce
is deÞnite, which should also be a measure of regulators independence. With a guaranteed term
of oﬃce, in fact, the regulator can exercise its mandate without being subject to the possibility of
being replaced by politicians responding to diﬀerent interests. Interestingly, controlling for this
variable increases the signiÞcance of all other measures. Moreover, both the new measure and the
previously used independences measure (OVER_NO) are highly signiÞcant and negative: a
more independent regulator liberalized less. In all speciÞcations, the pseudo R-squared is slightly
higher than in the previous models, which suggests that the role of regulatory institutions is
crucial to understand the regulatory process.
How can we compare the obtained results? The Þrst comparison can be done looking at
the goodness of Þt of the proposed models. We partially did it in the previous discussion.
Diﬀerently than in the cross-sectional estimations, we do not observe marked diﬀerences in the
pseudo R-squared among speciÞcations. The best speciÞcations, according to this measure of
Þt, are those related to political and regulatory institutions, which explain between 40% and
45% of the variability in the entry policy.
In order to perform a sort of speciÞcation test, we also estimate some mixed speciÞcations, in
which we insert the diﬀerent sets of variables simultaneously, but using only those variables that
have been found signiÞcant in the previous estimations. Table 8 displays our Þndings. In the
Þrst speciÞcation we use only political variables: the institutional measures, the governments
type, and its ideological position are considered. The previously observed stylized facts stay
true also in this richer speciÞcation at high signiÞcance levels. We then simultaneously use the
variables related to the political and regulatory institutions. Qualitatively and quantitatively
the results remain also in this case unchanged and parallel the Þndings previously observed.
Also using political institutions and private interests variables together (speciÞcation 3), or
regulatory institutions and private interest variables (speciÞcation 4) together, or all variables
together (speciÞcation 5) does not aﬀect the ßavor of our results, even though some diﬀerences
in the signiÞcance levels of the used variables can be observed.57 Also in this case, we can stress
56We divide the REP_YES dummy in two further dummies: REP_LEG=1 if the report duty is towards the
legislative, and REP_MIN=1 if the report duty is towards the sectorial minister.
57 In particular, using political institutions and private interest variables simultaneously reduce the signiÞcance
of our coeﬃcients estimates.
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that all sets of variables could help in disentangling policy variation.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we empirically analyzed the political economy of the regulatory reform in the mobile
telecommunications industry in 24 OECD countries during the 1990s. After giving an overview
of the literature on the political economy of economic policy, we identiÞed some theoretical
predictions that we would expect to be observed in the data. This exercise had the aim of
producing some robust stylized facts, which could help in the developing of new theoretical tools
for the analysis of the political economy of regulation. An unique data set, obtained by merging
diﬀerent data sources, was developed, which allows for a time-series and cross-sectional analysis
of the politics of the regulatory reform.
Diﬀerent strands of the literature were surveyed, in order to obtain the most general view
about the economic and political factors that shape economic policy. First, we asked what
is the role of the states political constitution - as expressed by the electoral rule, the regime
type, and by two other synthetic measures of political institutions - in shaping the regulatory
policy. Second, we asked what is the role of the governments types, concentrating on the political
viability that the diﬀerent governments types may have. Third, we analyzed the role of ideology
and partisanship: a synthetic measure of the governments overall right-left position, and two
other measures relative to speciÞc programmatic positions were considered. Fourth, the eﬀects
of the industrys private interests were analyzed in the spirit of the Chicago Schools approach to
regulation. And Þnally, we considered some characteristics of the regulatory authorities, in order
to analyze whether the regulatory institutions in place also shape the liberalization process.
Concerning the empirical speciÞcations, we adopted diﬀerent econometric techniques. As a
starting point we performed some cross-sectional regressions and then moved to a more accurate
analysis of the liberalization process using panel techniques. Some of the observed results found
a motivation in the existing theory, but we stressed the strong need for more speciÞc and
microfounded theoretical models, able to cover the diﬀerent approaches taken in this paper.
Some robust Þndings emerged out of our study. The Þrst robust result was that political
institutions also matter for the regulatory policy. In particular, countries with majoritarian
elections liberalized substantially more the mobile telecommunications industry. The regime
type seems instead to have had a less pronounced impact, even though, we observed a week
negative relationship between liberalization and presidential regimes. Finally, the more accurate
metric indexes of institutions showed that countries that were more majoritarian on the federal-
unitary dimension and, to a smaller extent, on the executive-party dimension have been better
able to produce policy change in the form of entry liberalization of the mobile telecommunications
28
market.
The governments type was also observed to be a relatively important factor that explained
the liberalization variability among countries. In particular, our Þndings suggested that coali-
tion governments slowed down the liberalization process, but, surprisingly, that this eﬀect was
declining the larger the coalition. The governments ideological position played only a minor
role. This can be partially explained by the fact that, during the sample period, there was a
generalized tendency in the entire political spectrum to consider entry deregulation as a good
policy. Our suggestion is that ideology might have been important in explaining how fast the
process was developed. The overall right-left position was not particularly signiÞcant, however
we found some weak evidence that right wing governments were, as expected, more favorable to
deregulation and liberalization. More interestingly, the programmatically announced position
in favor of the state intervention in the economy was at least partially fulÞlled in the realized
policy: governments that announced to be pro-regulation liberalized less.
We found strong evidence that the incumbents private interests were reßected in the lib-
eralization patterns. Strong incumbents were able to limit the extent of entry liberalization,
protecting the rent stemming from a highly concentrated industry. However, we stressed that it
would be necessary to directly assess the simultaneity between market and policy, when testing
the private interest theory of regulation, in order to avoid possible endogeneity problems.
Finally, regulatory institutions played a crucial role. Regulators accountability, in particular,
was a factor that helped the liberalization of entry in the mobile telecommunications industry.
While the results about the role of regulators independence were not clear cut, even though
it appeared that the regulators independence also shaped the policy decision, yet more in the
direction of a less liberalized environment.
In this study, we gave a Þrst glance at the data and found some results, which cannot be
fully explained by the existing theory on the political economy of regulation. We acknowledged
the need for some microfounded models, which can more clearly predict why and how political
and regulatory institutions - as well as the inßuence of pressure groups - matter for regulatory
policy. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to have some model on how the forces which
shape the regulatory process interact among each other, even though about this point we still
do not have any empirical evidence. While the development of such models is a challenging
theoretical issue per se, we also think that it could be very helpful for empirical analysis, since
it would help in the development of clear cut empirical tests.
This work reached the, perhaps obvious, conclusion that politics also matter for this kind
of industrial policy. One promising extension of our approach is the development of a political
model of industrial policy, where policy determination and policy incidence are simultaneously
considered (see Duso and Röller, 2001). This seems to us to be an challenging research Þeld
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both for empirical and theoretical industrial economists.
References
Alesina, Alberto, “Macro-economic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, 102, 651–78.
and Allan Drazen, “Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?,” American Economic Review,
1991, 81, 1170–88.
and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Austen-Smith, David, “Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation,” Journal
of Political Economy, 2000, 108, 1235–1269.
Baron, David, “Regulation and Legislative Choice,” RAND Journal of Economics, 1988, 19,
467–477.
Becker, Gary S., “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 1983, 98, 371–400.
Bergman, Lars, Chris Doyle, Jordi Gual, Lars Hultkrantz, Damien Neven, Lars-
Hendrik Röller, and Leonard Waverman, Europe’s Network Industries: Con‡ict-
ing Priorities. Monitoring European Deregulation. 1-Telecommunications, London: CEPR,
1998.
Bernheim, Douglas B. and Michael D. Whinston, “Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation,
and Economic In‡uence,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986, 101, 1–31.
Besley, Timothy and Anne Case, “Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of
Endogenous Policies,” The Economic Journal, 2000, 110, F672–F694.
Boylaud, Olivier and Giuseppe Nicoletti, “Regulation Market Structure and Performance
in Telecommunications,” Economics Department Working Paper, No. 237, OECD, Paris
2000.
Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullok, The Calculus of Consensus, Ann Arbour: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1962.
30
Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingelman, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric
Tanderbaum, Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors and Govern-
ments 1945-1998, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Chang, Ha-Joon, “The Economics and Politics of Regulation,” Cambridge Journal of Eco-
nomics, 1997, 21, 703–728.
Cusack, Thomas, “Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in the
Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989,” Public Choice, 1997, 91, 375–95.
De-Soto, Hernando, The Other Path, New York: Harper and Row, 1990.
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei Shleiler,
“The Regulation of Entry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117.
Duso, Tomaso, “Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: Evidence from the U.S.
Cellular Industry,” WZB Discussion Paper FS-IV 01-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für
Sozialforschung 2001.
and Lars-Hendrik Röller, “Toward a Political Economy of Industrial Organization: Em-
pirical Regularities from Deregulation,” WZB Discussion Paper FS-IV 01-17, Wissenschaft-
szentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 2001.
Estache, Antonio and David Martimort, “Transaction Costs, Politics, Regulatory Institu-
tions, and Regulatory Outcomes,” EDI Regulatory Reform Discussion Paper, The World
Bank, Washington D.C.
Faure-Grimaud, Antonie and David Martimort, “Regulatory Inertia,” mimeo, London
and Montreal 2000.
Fiorina, Morris P., “Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?,” Public Choice, 1982, 39, 33–66.
Gawande, Kishore and Usree Bandyopadhyay, “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the
Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection,” Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, 2000, 82, 139–152.
Goldberg, Penelopi and Giovanni Maggi, “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investiga-
tion,” American Economic Review, 1999, 89, 1135–1154.
Gonec, Rauf, Maria Maher, and Giuseppe Nicoletti, “The Implementation and E¤ects of
Regulatory Reform: Past Experience and Current Issues,” Economics Department Working
Paper, No. 251, OECD, Paris 2000.
31
and , Special Interest Politics, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Gruber, Harald and Frank Verboven, “The Evolution of Markets under Entry and Stan-
dards Regulation - The Case of Mobile Telecommunications,” International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 2001, 19, 1189–1212.
Hibbs, Douglas A., The American Political Economy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
, The Political Economy of Industrial Democracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Irwin, Douglas A. and Randal S. Kroszner, “Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Se-
curing Policy change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smooth-
Hawley,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1999, 42, 643–673.
Joskow, Paul and Nancy Rose, “The E¤ects of Economic Regulation,” in R. Schmalansee
and R.D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization.
Kalt, Joseph P. and Mark A. Zupan, “Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of
Politics,” American Economic Review, 1984, 74, 302–22.
Keefer, Philip, “When Do Special Interests Run Rampant? Disentangling the Role of Elec-
tions, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crisis,” Technical
Report, Development Research Group, World Bank 2001.
Kroszner, Randal S. and Phil Strahan, “What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Pol-
itics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
1999, 114, 1437–1467.
La¤ont, Jean-Jacques, “Industrial Policy and Politics,” International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 1996, 14, 1–27.
, Incentives and Political Economy: 1997 Clarendon Lectures, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999.
and David Martimort, “Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 1999, 30, 232–262.
32
and Jean Tirole, “The Politics of Decision-Making: Regulatory Institutions,” Journal
of Law Economics and Organization, 1990, 6, 1–32.
and , “The Politics of Government Decision-Making: a Theory of Regulatory Cap-
ture,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, 106, 1089–1127.
and , A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 1993.
Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller, Regulations, Institutions and Commitment, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Li, Wei, Christine Zhen-Wei Qiang, and Lixin Colin Xu, “The Political Economy of
Privatisation and Competition: Cross-Country Evidence from the Telecommunications Sec-
tor,” mimeo, World Bank and Virginia University 2001.
Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Limdep, User’s Manual, Version 7.0 1999. Econometric Software.
Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Perisco, “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative
Electoral Incentives,” American Economic Review, 2001, 91, 225–239.
Long, Scott J., Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables, Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1997.
Maddala, G.S., Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political control of
Agencies,” Virginia Law Review, 1989, 75, 431–482.
Milesi-Ferretti, Gian-Maria, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno, “Electoral
Rules and Public Spending,” Discussion Paper No. 2742, CEPR 2001.
Neven, Damien, Robin Nuttal, and Paul Seabright, Mergers in Daylight. The Economics
and Policy of Merger control in the EC, London: CEPR, 1993.
Nicoletti, Giuseppe, “Regulation in Services: OECD Patterns and Economic Implications,”
Economics Department Working Paper, No. 278, OECD, Paris 2001.
Noll, Roger, “Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation,” in R. Schmalansee and
R.D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1989.
33
, “Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries,” in Anne O. Krueger, ed., Eco-
nomic and Policy Reform: The Second Stage, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
OECD, “Regulatory Reform in Network Industries: Past Experience and Current Issues,” in
“OECD Economic Outlook No. 67” 2000.
Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1965.
Peltzman, Sam, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 1976, 19, 211–240.
, “The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation,” Brookings papers
in Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1989, Special Issue, 1–41.
Persson, Torsten, “Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?,” Econometrica, 2001,
forthcoming.
and Guido Tabellini, “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with
Rational Politicians. 1998 Marshall Lecture,” European Economic Review, 1999, 43, 699–
735.
and , Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press,
2000.
and , “Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?,”
mimeo, Stockholm and Milan 2001.
, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini, “Separation of Powers and Political Account-
ability,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112, 1163–1202.
Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal, “The enduring nineteenth-century battle for eco-
nomic regulation: the Interstate Commerce Act revisited,” The Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 1993, 36, 837–860.
Potters, Jan and Randolph Sloof, “Interest Groups: A Survey of Empirical Models That
Try to Assess Their In‡uence,” European Journal of Political Economy, 1996, 12, 403–442.
Pryor, Frederic L., “Quantitative Notes on The Extent of Governmental Regulations in Var-
ious OECD Nations,” mimeo, Swarthmore College 2000.
34
Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal, “Modern Political Economy and the Study of
Regulation,” in Elisabeth Bailey, ed., Public Regulation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987,
pp. 73–116.
Spiller, Pablo T., “Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency
Theory of Regulation, or ‘Let Them Be Bribed,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1990, 33,
65–101.
Stata, User’s Manual, Version 7.0 2001. Econometric Software.
Stigler, George, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics, 1971,
pp. 3–21.
Tsebelis, George, “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliamentarism, Muliticameralism and Multipartyism,” British Journal of Political Sci-
ence, 1995, 25, 289–325.
Winston, Cli¤ord, “Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists,” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 1993, 31, 1263–89.
Woldendorp, Jaap, Hans Keman, and Ian Budge, “Party government in 20 democracies:
an update (1990-1995),” European Journal of Political Research, 1998, 33, 125–164.
35
T
ab
les
T
ab
le
1a.
D
escrip
tion
of
V
ariab
les
V
ariab
le
D
escrip
tion
S
ou
rce
C
ou
ntries
A
u
s,
A
u
t,
B
el,
C
an
,
D
en
,
F
in
,
F
ra,
G
er,
G
re,
Ice,
Ire,
Ita,
Jap
,
L
u
x,
N
et,
N
Z
,
N
or,
P
or,
S
p
a,
S
w
e,
S
w
i,
T
u
r,
U
K
,
U
S
A
P
O
P
T
otal
P
op
u
lation
in
100.000
O
E
C
D
statistical
A
C
T
P
O
P
A
ctive
P
op
u
lation
aged
b
etw
een
15
an
d
64
years
in
100.000
com
p
en
d
iu
m
Y
P
C
A
n
nu
al
In
com
e
P
er
C
ap
ita
in
1995
con
stant
th
ou
san
d
U
S
$
M
A
JO
R
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
th
e
cou
ntry
h
as
a
m
a
joritarian
election
system
P
ersson
an
d
T
ab
ellin
i
(1999)
P
R
E
S
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
th
e
cou
ntry
h
as
a
p
resid
ential
regim
e
E
X
E
C
_
P
A
R
In
d
ex:
con
sen
su
s
in
th
e
execu
tive-p
arty
d
im
en
sion
L
ijp
h
art
(1999)
F
E
D
_
U
N
IT
In
d
ex:
con
sen
su
s
in
th
e
fed
eral-u
n
itary
d
im
en
sion
G
O
V
1P
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
on
e-p
arty
govern
m
ent
W
old
en
d
orp
(1998)
G
O
V
C
O
A
L
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
coalition
govern
m
ent
C
O
A
L
S
IZ
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
arties
in
th
e
coalition
govern
m
ents
O
P
P
_
P
A
R
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
arties
in
th
e
op
p
osition
P
S
E
A
T
_
G
O
P
ercentage
seats
in
th
e
legislatu
re
h
eld
by
govern
m
ent
p
arties
R
IL
E
In
d
ex:
govern
m
ent
p
osition
on
th
e
right-left
d
im
en
sion
(h
igh
er
valu
es
for
right
w
in
g
p
arties)
B
u
d
ge
et
al.
(2001)
P
R
O
_
R
E
G
G
overn
m
ents
p
rogram
m
atic
p
osition
:
P
ro
m
arket
regu
lation
s
(w
eighted
average
of
govern
m
ents
p
arties
p
osition
)
W
E
L
F
_
L
IM
G
overn
m
ents
p
rogram
m
atic
p
osition
:
P
ro
w
elfare
state
lim
itation
(w
eighted
average
of
govern
m
ents
p
arties
p
osition
)
F
IX
R
E
G
In
d
ex:
Inten
sity
of
regu
lation
in
th
e
w
irelin
e
telecom
m
u
n
ication
s
in
d
u
stry
B
oylau
d
an
d
N
icoletti
(2001)
M
O
B
R
E
G
In
d
ex:
Inten
sity
of
regu
lation
in
th
e
m
ob
ile
telecom
m
u
n
ication
s
in
d
u
stry
D
IG
IT
L
IB
D
egree
of
lib
eralization
in
th
e
d
igital
m
ob
ile
in
d
u
stry
(1=
m
on
op
oly,
2=
d
u
op
oly,
3=
com
p
etition
)
O
E
C
D
R
egu
lation
D
atab
ase
S
H
_
M
D
1
M
arket
sh
ares
of
th
e
in
cu
m
b
ent
op
erator
(1997)
S
H
_
IN
C
M
O
S
h
are
of
in
cu
m
b
ent
op
erator
d
etain
ed
by
th
e
state
(1997)
R
E
V
_
M
O
B
A
n
nu
al
revenu
es
in
th
e
m
ob
ile
telecom
m
u
n
ication
s
in
d
u
stry
(1995
con
stant
U
S
$)
T
E
R
M
_
D
E
F
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
regu
altors
term
of
oﬃ
ce
is
d
eÞ
n
ite
A
P
P
_
G
O
V
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
regu
altor
is
ap
p
ointed
by
th
e
p
rim
e
m
in
ister
A
P
P
_
P
R
E
S
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
regu
altor
is
ap
p
ointed
by
th
e
p
resid
ent
F
IN
_
IN
D
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
th
e
regu
lation
au
th
ority
is
Þ
n
an
ced
(at
least
p
artially)
by
in
d
u
stry
fees
R
E
P
_
Y
E
S
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
th
e
regu
latory
au
th
ority
h
as
to
rep
ort
eith
er
to
th
e
legislatu
re
(R
E
P
_
L
E
G
)
or
to
th
e
m
in
ister
(R
E
P
_
M
IN
)
O
V
E
R
_
N
O
D
u
m
m
y
=
1
if
th
e
regu
latory
au
th
oritys
d
ecision
s
can
n
ot
b
e
overtu
rn
ed
by
oth
er
in
stitu
tion
s
Table 1b. Preliminary Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Cases
POP 483.7358 712.0181 3.8980 2667.9200 168
ACTPOP 321.9546 469.4767 2.6810 1753.5700 168
YPC 19.5914 10.8051 0.1338 43.8045 168
MAJOR 0.2500 0.4343 0.0000 1.0000 168
PRES 0.0830 0.2772 0.0000 1.0000 168
EXEC_PAR 0.2062 1.0123 -1.4700 1.8700 168
FED_UNIT 0.1075 1.1564 -1.7700 2.5300 168
GOVCOAL 0.5714 0.4964 0.0000 1.0000 168
GOV1P 0.4226 0.4955 0.0000 1.0000 168
COALSIZ 1.9702 1.1706 1.0000 5.0000 168
OPP_PAR 4.1607 2.0248 1.0000 10.0000 168
PSEAT_GO 54.8373 12.3712 13.9881 85.6152 168
RILE 1.0036 18.5006 -37.2595 48.7013 168
PRO_REG 1.7701 1.5668 0.0000 6.2500 168
WELF_LIM 0.4470 0.8881 0.0000 4.200 168
FIXREG 0.4479 0.2331 0.1742 0.8814 168
MOBREG 0.6065 0.2154 0.1590 0.9529 168
DIGITLIB 2.0476 0.8175 1.0000 3.0000 168
SH_MD1 62.9000 22.2988 0.0000 100.0000 161
SH_INCMO 56.8308 32.4556 0.0000 100.0000 91
REV_MOB 0.1E+13 0.7E+13 0.1E+08 0.9E+14 146
TERM_DEF 0.6667 0.4728 0.0000 1.0000 168
APP_GOV 0.2917 0.4559 0.0000 1.0000 168
APP_PRES 0.1667 0.3738 0.0000 1.0000 168
FIN_IND 0.6667 0.4728 0.0000 1.0000 168
REP_YES 0.7500 0.4343 0.0000 1.0000 168
REP_LEG 0.2500 0.4343 0.0000 1.0000 168
REP_MIN 0.5000 0.5015 0.0000 1.0000 168
OVER_NO 0.7083 0.4559 0.0000 1.0000 168
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Table 3. Panel Regressions - Ordered Probit with Random Eﬀects
Political Institutions
SpeciÞcation 1 SpeciÞcation 2 SpeciÞcation 3
Coeﬀ. St.Err. Coeﬀ. St.Err. Coeﬀ. St.Err.
Constant -3.2341 0.9394 *** -0.8064 0.7230 -1.7926 1.1150 *
YPC -0.0006 0.0341 -0.0021 0.0392 0.0012 0.0247
POP 0.0008 0.0007 0.0019 0.0011 * -0.0005 0.0024
TIME_IND 1.0339 0.2237 *** 0.9886 0.1791 *** 1.0577 0.2731 ***
MAJOR 8.5218 1.8994 *** 12.1643 2.5255 ***
PRES -3.6621 4.7755 -0.4212 5.8852
EXEC_PAR -1.6410 0.4109 *** -0.4970 0.9035
FED_UNIT -0.9808 0.3836 *** -2.3829 0.9253 ***
Mu(01) 4.9791 0.9188 *** 4.6056 0.7763 *** 4.9582 1.0905 ***
Sigma 4.2509 0.8551 *** 4.7398 0.7971 *** 4.4729 1.3397 ***
N. obs. 168 168 168
Log likelihood -69.8868 -74.5568 -73.6207
Pseudo R2 0.4213 0.3826 0.3904
Chi-squared 146.6302 173.6584 111.5218
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%, 5%, and 10% signiÞcance level respectively.
Table 4. Panel Regressions - Ordered Probit with Random Eﬀects
Governments Types
SpeciÞcation 1 SpeciÞcation 2
Coeﬀ St.Err. Coeﬀ St.Err.
Constant -0.6484 0.5205 -1.8984 1.2529
YPC -0.0007 0.0243 -0.0017 0.0266
POP 0.0011 0.0006 * 0.0020 0.0010 *
TIME_IND 1.0499 0.2470 *** 1.1527 0.3839 ***
GOVCOAL -3.2626 1.2434 *** -6.6540 2.8610 **
COALSIZ 0.3642 0.2671 1.7623 0.9235 *
PSEAT_GO 0.0112 0.0123
OPP_PAR 0.0791 0.1319
Mu(01) 4.8461 0.9502 *** 5.5793 1.7723 **
Sigma 4.9484 1.1164 *** 4.9088 1.4133 ***
Obs. 168 168
Log likelihood -73.5973 -72.6033
Pseudo R2 0.3905 0.3988
Chi-squared 168.5929 157.5847
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%, 5%, and 10% signiÞcance level respectively.
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Table 5. Panel Regressions - Ordered Probit with Random Eﬀects
Ideology and Programmatic Positions
SpeciÞcation 1 SpeciÞcation 2 SpeciÞcation 3
Coeﬀ. St. Err. Coeﬀ. St. Err. Coeﬀ. St. Err.
CONSTANT -0.1604 0.7566 -1.7350 1.0485 * -0.7505 1.1732
YPC -0.0007 0.0231 0.0014 0.0131 0.0005 0.0069
POP 0.0009 0.0007 0.0002 0.0008 0.0006 0.0011
TIME_IND 1.0875 0.2337 *** 1.1229 0.3704 *** 1.3096 0.7203 *
RILE 0.0281 0.0121 ** 0.0181 0.0168
PRO_REG -0.5237 0.1658 *** -0.7271 0.3032 ***
WELF_LIM 1.2390 0.5131 ** 1.2391 0.7905
Mu(01) 5.3502 0.9540 *** 5.3282 1.4410 *** 6.3057 3.0396 **
Sigma 4.8138 0.9345 *** 6.7647 1.7510 *** 5.2732 2.5727 **
Obs. 168 168 168
Log likelihood -73.5089 -65.2567 -67.2168
Pseudo R2 0.3913 0.4596 0.4434
Chi-squared 177.4725 176.9574 172.8027
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%, 5%, and 10% signiÞcance level respectively.
Table 6. Panel Regressions - Ordered Probit with Random Eﬀects
Private Interests
SpeciÞcation 1 SpeciÞcation 2 SpeciÞcation 3
Coeﬀ. St. Err. Coeﬀ. St. Err. Coeﬀ. St. Err.
CONSTANT 14.4126 4.2054 *** 12.6041 4.1404 *** 12.0266 5.6756 **
YPC -0.0007 0.0209 -0.0008 0.0482 -0.0007 0.018
POP 0.0010 0.0026 0.0003 0.0029 0.0002 0.0065
TIME_IND 1.1187 0.3461 *** 1.1557 0.5064 ** 1.1845 0.3837 ***
SH_MD1 -0.1100 0.0283 *** -0.1441 0.0464 *** -0.1207 0.0384 ***
log(REV_MOB) -0.4394 0.1890 -0.2021 0.1771 -0.3156 0.2910
ACTPOP 0.0005 0.0037 0.0006 0.0040 0.0014 0.0112
FIN_IND -2.1413 1.1814 *** 0.9685 0.9539
SH_INCMO 0.0011 0.0010
Mu(01) 4.7650 1.1702 *** 5.2609 1.6245 ** 5.4180 1.4459 ***
Sigma 4.2537 1.0094 *** 4.5580 1.8092 ** 4.9174 1.2013 ***
Obs. 139 139 139
Log likelihood -61.8721 -60.2144 -59.2535
Pseudo R2 0.3804 0.3970 0.4066
Chi-squared 120.6920 121.7747 122.2870
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%, 5%, and 10% signiÞcance level respectively.
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Table 7. Panel Regressions - Ordered Probit with Random Eﬀects
Regulatory Institutions
SpeciÞcation 1 SpeciÞcation 2 SpeciÞcation 3
Coeﬀ. St. Err. Coeﬀ. St. Err.
CONSTANT -6.9842 2.3154 *** -6.5866 3.8273 * -15.2353 4.3514 ***
YPC -0.0029 0.0619 -0.0013 0.0488 -0.0046 0.0854
POP 0.0026 0.0016 * 0.0016 0.0023 0.0042 0.0018 **
TIME_IND 1.0531 0.2148 *** 1.0617 0.3480 *** 1.0847 0.3190 ***
REP_LEG 6.9991 2.2797 *** 2.7693 1.7634 8.5697 3.4029 **
REP_MIN 6.6765 2.0772 *** 6.8230 2.4643 *** 15.2268 4.1670 ***
OVER_NO -0.2902 0.7754 -0.7240 1.6595 -4.3335 2.4022 **
APP_GOV 3.5282 1.4275 ** 7.1314 3.0020 **
APP_PRES 4.7662 1.4327 *** 5.8261 2.5710 **
TERM_DEF -0.0094 0.0040 **
Mu(01) 5.0144 0.9222 *** 4.9942 1.3628 *** 5.0983 1.1394 ***
Sigma 4.8900 1.0709 *** 5.1562 1.3399 *** 5.5877 1.7546 ***
Obs. 168 168 168
Log likelihood -67.2545 -67.7132 -65.7883
Pseudo R2 0.4431 0.4393 0.4552
Chi-squared 135.4026 132.2688 118.0623
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%, 5%, and 10% signiÞcance level respectively.
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